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ABSTRACT
In an earlier paper "Granger—causality and Policy Effectiveness,"
Economica [1984], 1 showed that for a policy instrument x to
Granger—cause some targetvariabley is not necessary for x to be useful
in controlling y.(The argument that it is not su+ficient was already
familiar, e.g. from the work of Sargent). Using a linear rational
expectations model I showed that x would fail to Branger—cause y (while
y did, in some cases, Granqer—cause ) if
:were set by a variety of
optimal, time—consistent or ad hoc policy feedback rules. Yet in all
the examples, x was an effective policy instrument.
In response to some comments by Professor Granger, I now show that
my earlier results are unaffected when the following 3 concessions to
"rea1ism are made:
1. Controllers do not have perfect control of the instruments (this
was already allowed for in my earlier paper).
2. Governments may use a different information set to determine
instruments than that used by the public.
3. The controller may not have perfect specifications and estimates of
models of the economy.
The analysis confirms that 6ranger—causality tests are
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In my (1984) paper, "Granger—causality and Policy Effectiveness," I
argued that "Granger—causality" is unnecessary and insufficient for policy
effectiveness. Since it was already weLl—established that the fact that a
poLicy instrument x Granger—caused some economic variable y, did not imply
that x could be used to control. or influence y (see e.g. Sargent [1976]), my
paper focused on the case where x does not Granger—cause y yet can be used to
influence or control y.I established this in the context of linear rational
expectations models with known, constant coefficients, by demonstrating that x
would fail to Granger—cause y (while y did, in some cases Granger—cause x) if
x were set by a variety of Optimal., time—consistent or ad—hoc (stochastic or
non—stochastic) linear feedback rules. Yet in all the examples chosen, x was
an effective policy instrument: different values of x (different
realizations of x) were cet par. associated with different values of
(different realizations of i ￿ 0, and different (linear feedback) rules
governing x did generate different conditional and/or unconditional
distribution functions for y.
In his response to my paper professor Granger (1986) does not dispute
that the examples I gave were correct. Rather than attacking the logic of my
argument, its relevance is denied:
"However, the framework considered by Buiter is academic,
sterile and quite unrealistic and is thus a very special.
situation. To make it more realistic three further items
need consideration:
(i) controllers do not have perfect control of the
instruments,
(ii) governments mayusea different information set
Ito determine instruments than that used by
tke public,Q, to form expectations and to
anticipate instrumental variables, and
(iii) economy controllers in practice do not have
perfectly formed specifications and estimatesFR—029/IDPR/O8—13—86 2
of models of the economy ...,theydo not have
a consistent or cLear—cut value for the target
or desired vaLues for endogenous variables and
they do not have a specific cost function,
They may thus appear to be behaving
irrationally or sub—optimally by a publdc using
a different model, a different information set
and an assumed set of targets and cost
functions." (Granger [19861, pp. 7—8).
I shall show that Professor Granger's points (i), (ii) and (iii) are
irrelevant for the issue of the informativeness concerning poLicy
effectiveness of Granger—causality tests. This will be done using his own
suggested modifications of my formal framework.









isa vector of state, target or endogenous variables, x a vector of
instruments, bt a vector of exogenous variables and u a white noise
disturbance vector assumed to be orthogonal both to the private sector's
information set and to the public sector's information set E is
the mathematical expectation operator.
For simplicity and notationaL economy, and because none of Professor
Granger's objections to my paper are affected by it, I shall in this rejoinder
purge the model of expectations and exogenous variables, i.e. B1 =B2
=b
=
0.Therefore, the model of the economy (Professor Granger's "plant equation")
is
(2) Y AY+Cx u
t t—1 ttFR—029/DPR/08—13—86 3
InsideLags and Outside Lags
Professor Granger objects to the notion of an instantaneous,
immediate or contemporaneous effect of x on 1.
"[Because of the timing question, the usuaL notion of
causing y, with Lags inherent in the definition of
causation, wilL here be denoted as x_1 causing i"
(Cranger [1986), p. 3).
I consider it unnecessarily restrictive to rule out instantaneous effects from
x on y, since automatic (fiscal) stabilizers are assumed to work in
precisely that manner, but in the interest of maximizing the common ground I
would be quite happy to grant Professor Granger a lag, in which case equation
(2) becomes:
-
(2') 1 AY+Bx +u
t t—1 t—l t
Professor Granger's arguments about timing appear, however, to
confuse what in the economic policy literature have long been called "inside
lags" and "outside lags" in the policy process. The inside lag is the lag
between the period, t say, in which an instrument value x is realized and the
first period, t —t,t ￿ 0 say, in which the ful1 information was
available on which the controller based his or her decision concerning x.
The inside lag reflects the many sources of delay in the policy design and
implementation process.
The outside lag is the minimal Lag, TO ￿0say, between the period in
which a value for the control is realized, t — t0,
say, and the period in
which it has its first effect on the endogenous variable, t. In equation (2)FR—O29IDPRIOB—13—86 4
the outside lag is 0, in equation (2') it is 1. The inside lag hasn't been
specified yet. In equations (3a, b) beLow it is 1. A non—economic example
may help. Let t be the period in which the French government explodes an H—
bomb; t—i, i ￿ 0 the period in which the decision was taken to explode that
bomb in period t, or the period with the most recent information that was
still reflected in the decision to stage the expLosion at t; and t+j, j ￿ 0
the first period in which the fallout reaches Australia. Here j is the
outside lag and i the inside lag.
In his rejection of instantaneous causation, Professor Granger seems
to argue for a minimal outside lag of one period. He also appears to argue in
favor of (at least) a one period inside lag, since, using his notation, x is
specified as:
(3a) x = + e
where et is white noise with respect to the information set 'tl•et is a
policy implementation error.
-
(3b) w1 =E[x I't—11
The final equation Professor Cranger appears to favor does, however,
not appear to have any outside lag. Since my results concerning Granger—
causality and policy effectiveness hold for any inside and/or outside lags, I
am happy to follow Professor Granger's lead here and to use equations (2) and
(3a, b) rather than (2') and (3a, b).FR—029/DPR/08—13—86 5
Granger—causaLity and Policy Effectiveness in a "Realistic" Setting
Private agents in period t have the information set which contains
and i ￿ 0. The government in period t has the information set
which contains x_j and i ￿ 0. is the vector of extra
information available to the government. Let (y, z). Y is governed
by equation (2) or, partitioning all vectors and matrices conformably,
(4) =A11A12 + +
A21A22 C2
=[uj
uJ is a white noise disturbance vector. It is orthogonal to
and therefore also to
The poLicy rule is given by (3a,b), where et is orthogonal to 't—l
(but not necessarily to
Furthermore, using my ownnotation,
(5) w1 = t—1)+
ttl
is orthogonal to (but not necessarily to It reflects
"uncertain and changing policy objectives."








reflects the extra information available to the government. It is
orthogonal to but not necessarily to
It's obviously true that' if the public estimates an equation such as
(4) from just the and w or x, then the instrument vector generated by
(3a,b) and (5) or by (3a,b) and (6a,b,c) will contain information about the
that are unobserved by the public. Cranger causality tests involving just y
and x may therefore incorrectly attribute the incremental predictive power
over y of the omitted variables z to the x variables. The term "incorrectLy"
in the previous sentence means incorrectly as Cranger—causality tests, that is
incorrectly as tests of "incremental predictive content" [Schwert (1979)].
Even if this familiar omitted variables problem is absent, correctLy conducted
Cranger—causality tests wilt not be informative about the government's scope
for influencing or controlling the (or through the x.
This becomes clear once we do the Cranger—causality test correctly
for and x. For simplicity, let the (I_1 t—1) function in (5) be a
time—invariant linear function C of i.e.
(1) = c'ç_1 +
whereG is a constant matrix and is orthogonal to {Y., i ? 1}. The







By assumption, u, £i and et are all orthogonal toTt—1' i.e.
orthogonal to Simple inspection will confirm the following: (i)
controllers do not have perfect control of the instruments (as evidencedby
the presence in (8) and (9) of er); (ii)governments may Use a different
information set from that used by the public[x may feed back from which
is not contained in and (iii) governments may have uncertain and
changing policy objectives is present in (8) and (9)). Nevertheless,
will fail to Granger—cause I while, unless C =0,x does influence I and can
be used to control I.In addition, in this example, I will Cranger—causex.
Paraphrasing the introduction to my (1984) paper, equations (8) and (9)
demonstrate that, if the value of a vector of endogenous variables isa
function of current, past, and/or expected future values ofa vector of policy
instruments, and if the instruments are functions of current and/or lagged
values of the endogenous variables (plus white noise), then the instruments
won't Granger—cause the endogenous variableseven though changing the policy
rule may alter the dependence of the endogenous variableson their own lagged
values and on the exogenous variables.
Conclusions
There are important practical issues and even somemoderately deep
conceptual issues involved in first defining and then measuring policy
effectiveness. Even in models without forward—looking rationalexpectations,FR—029/DPR/08—13—86 B
policy effectiveness is a multi—dimensional concept. First one should specify
the precise nature of the change in the policy rule that is being considered
(whether it is a change in the known value of a coefficient in a policy
feedback rule; a change in the variance of the disturbance term in the policy
rule, etc.). Second, one shouLd determine the exact nature of the changes in
the joint distribution functions of the endogenous or target variables that
result from the policy rule change. Does the change in the policy rule alter
these conditional or unconditional means of these variables, their conditional.
or unconditional variances and covariances, etc.?
In models with forward—looking rational expectations, the
counterfactual to the policy experiment must be specified carefully.
"Effective relative.to what?" is not answered very easily. In the most
general case the counterfactual is to be thought of along the lines of the
following thought experiment. Consider two economic systems, identical in all
respects except for the poLicy rule. This policy rule may be open—loop and
non—stochastic, open—loop stochastic, closed loop with only additive
uncertainty or closed—loop with more general uncertainty such as random
multiplicative parameters. Economic agents are endowed with more or less
accurate subjective priors over current and future policy behavior, which they
may update sequentially, say in Bayerian fashion, as new realizations of the
policy variables are observed. "Changes in policy" here means different
drawings from the "objective" policy instrument rule distribution function.
Policy effectiveness is measured by differences in the reaLizations or
distribution functions of the endogenous target variables when different
drawings are made from the policy instrument rule distribution function.
This is a—historical, "alternative universes" counterfactual is not
in fact different from the "historical counter—factual" which economists oftenFR—029/DPR/O8—13—86 9
appear to have in mind when discussing economic policy. The historical
counterfactual asks about the consequence of changing a policy rule at a point
in time rather than about differences between target variable behavior when
there are differences between the poLicy ruLes during one or more periods in
two otherwise identicaL universes. To anaLyse the consequences of a change in
the policy rule at t' we must known when and to what extent this change was
anticipated by private and government agents, the degree to which it was
perceived as permanent or transitory and the degree of confidence with which
these expectations were held. Providing all this information amounts to
constructing the a—historical counterfactuat.
This rejoinder has ampLified what I established in my 1984 paper:
Cranger—causality tests, are no in any way useful or relevant for establishing
the presence or absence of policy effectiveness, even when all the technical
problems associated with conducting these tests properly are absent or
resolved (including any missing variables problems). For instance, if
monetary and fiscal variables do not Granger—cause some real or nominal
variables (such as CDP, the inflation rate or the exchange rate) this has no
implications as regards the ability of the monetary and fiscal authorities to
use these monetary and fiscal variables to control the economy. If the
exchange rate does not Granger—cause the price level this does not mean that a
devaluation won't raise the price level.
Ironically, a well—known paper by Professor Granger [19801 contains
in consecutive paragraphs two statements, the first of which reflects the same
confusion that prompted his response to my paper, while the second is correct.
The (incorrect) first statement occurs after a brief discussion of
exogeneity.FR—029/DPR/08--13—86 10
"One can argue that a government controlled interest rate
is in fact partLy determined by previous movements
elsewhere in the economy, and so is not strictly
exogenous. The true exogenous part of such a variable is
that which cannot be forecast from other variables and
its own past, and it follows that it is only this part
that has any policy impact." (Cranger [1980], p. 350,
italics added).
The non—sequitur in the last sentence parallels Professor Granger's
misunderstanding of the relation between testing for Cranger—causality and for
policy effectiveness.
For a policy variable or instrument to have impact or be effective,
it is neither necessary nor sufficient that a change in the rule governing the
instrument makes the actual behavior of the target variables different from
what was expected. Rather, both actual and expected behavior should be
different from what they would have been absent the change in the rule. It is
perfectly sensible, e.g. to analyze policy (iri)effectiveness issues using a
deterministic model. Granger—causality tests of course only make sense in
non—deterministic models.
The (correct) second statement occurs immediately following the
first.
"It is also worth pointing out that controllability is a much
deeper property than causality, in my opinion, although some
writers have confused the two concepts. If Y causes X, it
does not necessarily mean that Y can be used to control X."
(Cranger, 1980, p.351).
Both my paper and this rejoinder are no more than amplifications of this
statement.KUL1U(fL)ö1jöb 11
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